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ABSTRACT  
Labour market conditions in Greece have severely deteriorated during the crisis, affecting 
youths the most. Using the Greek crisis as a case-study, this paper examines the role of the 
family as a social safety net for its young members. Specifically, we test the relationship 
between youth labour outcomes and parental coresidence, whether this relationship has 
become stronger during the crisis, and the degree to which the relationship is causal. Our results 
confirm that the parental home is a refuge both for jobless youth and for those in poorly paid, 
insecure jobs, and this role has intensified during the crisis. We find no reverse causality 
between co-residence and employment status for young men, and significant reverse causality 
for women. This finding implies that all youths live in the parental home when they are in need 
themselves, but it is young women not men who live with parents when parents are in need or 
for cultural reasons. 
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1. Introduction  
 
The Great Recession has drawn much attention on the safety nets available to vulnerable 
population groups, especially young people. Considerable concern has emerged about whether 
struggling youths could turn to their families for housing but also on whether this would delay 
their transition to adulthood. Naturally, the concern has focused on countries affected most 
strongly by the crisis but large and diverge changes in coresidence rates were also observed 
elsewhere. Among the OECD countries, for example, the share of 15-29 year-olds living with 
their parents increased the most in France by an impressive 12.5 percentage points, while other 
countries like Slovenia and the UK recorded a decline (OECD, 2016). These mixed experiences 
stem from the complex and often counteracting determinants of youth living arrangements, 
which include various economic factors but also non-economic factors like culture. Our paper 
exploits the unique experience of Greece to quantify the relative contribution of these factors 
with a particular focus on labour market decline. 
 
But why is the case of Greece particularly interesting? The Greek crisis brought a deterioration in 
labour market conditions unprecedented in the advanced world during peacetime, even 
surpassing the corresponding deterioration in the US during the Great Depression in both depth 
and duration. As expected, the crisis hit young people the hardest. As a share of total labour 
force participation, unemployment in Greece exceeded 27% in 2013, but for the young 
population in particular (ages 15-24) the rate reached 60%. While both rates have fallen since, 
the fall has been inconsequential (current rates are at 20.5% and 40%, respectively). This 
staggering differential across age-groups developed despite an impressive acceleration in youth 
emigration, and even those young Greeks who managed to remain and work in the country did 
not escape the ordeal. Young workers were already in precarious or low-paid jobs before the 
crisis but became increasingly so, especially after a wave of labour market reforms that took 
place in 2012, including a 32% cut in the youth sub-minimum wage (as compared to the 22% cut 
for those older than 25) and a radical decentralisation of wage bargaining. At the same time, 
public safety nets have been scarce. On the one hand, unemployment insurance, which is only 
available to those with some work experience, has been tightened further, fully offsetting the 
marginal improvements in unemployment assistance and other benefits; on the other hand, 
charities and NGOs help mostly those in extreme poverty (see Matsaganis, 2015, for a compact 
review of the evidence). Thus, the fall back mechanisms available to vulnerable youth are 
offered mostly by the Greek family which, as elsewhere in Southern Europe, has traditionally 
protected its young members even beyond adulthood (Iacovou 2002 provides cross-country 
evidence on living arrangements; Saraceno 1994 and 2016, Calzata and Brooks 2013, and others 
debate over the nature and limits of South European 'familism'). 
 
This combination of extreme and prolonged recession in a country with a tradition of strong 
family ties provides a testing ground for how economic forces and culture interact to render the 
family a private safety net for its young members. Here, we exploit this testing ground to 
investigate (i) whether familial co-residence in Greece shows a response to youth employment 
outcomes; (ii) whether this response has changed over the crisis; and (iii) to what extent this 
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response causally derives from an increased dependence of young adults on their parents 
induced by the crisis, as opposed to factors unrelated with the crisis or an increased dependence 
of parents on youth, given that parents have also faced economic hardship.  
 
Our exercise lies on the foundations of the household formation theory by McElroy and Horney 
(1981) and subsequent extensions (McElroy 1985, Rozenweig and Wolpin 1993, Ermisch and 
DiSalvo 1997, Ermisch 1999, Giannelli and Monfardini 2003, Kaplan 2012), which treat living 
arrangements as the result of bargaining between parents and children. Typically, in these 
models, the utility function of young adults, who may choose consumption, market work, 
human capital investments and independence, enters the utility function of parents and 
influences their optimal choice. The underlying assumption is either that parents have altruistic 
motives, i.e. they decide whether to coreside or not based on what they perceive to be best for 
their children, or because they have selfish motives, i.e. they aim to receive something in 
exchange (e.g. companionship, care at old-age etc.). In either case, the models describe the joint 
determination of economic outcomes and living arrangements, and derive conditions under 
which young people will opt to leave the parental home or move back to the parental home 
after a period of living autonomously. Our paper adds to the empirical literature that tests these 
theoretical predictions. 
 
Empirical studies centered in urban and real estate economics, economic demography, or labour 
economics have focused on different determinants of living arrangements, but they are closely 
interconnected and mostly confirm or complement each other. All else equal, these studies have 
shown that living arrangements respond to cultural norms (Giuliano 2007) and a number of 
economic factors, including house and rental prices (Börsch-Supan 1986, Haurin et al. 1993, 
Ermisch and DiSalvo 1997, Ermisch 1999); labour outcomes and income of parents and adult 
children (Becker et al. 2005, Manacorda and Moretti 2006, Chiuri and Del Boca 2010, Engelhardt 
et al. 2016); and broader market conditions and economic recessions (Card and Lemiux 2000, 
Lee and Painter 2013, Bitler and Hoynes 2015, Matsudaira 2016, Wiemers 2017). It is 
noteworthy however that there is yet no consensus on whether the economic effect is 
meaningfully large (compare, for example, the recent evidence from US data by Bitler and 
Hoynes (2015) and Matsudaira (2016)) or in the expected direction (see Ahn and Sanchez-
Marcos (2017) for evidence of procyclical coresidence in Spain). 
 
While most studies identify the reduced-form impact of the determinants of interest, a few have 
adopted a more structural approach allowing work outcomes, living arrangements, and 
investments in human capital to be jointly determined (McElroy 1985, Martínez-Granado & Ruiz-
Castillo 2002, Gianelli and Monfardini 2003). Structural models sustain close links to theory and 
have the potential for elucidating the full range of factors behind the reduced-form results. 
However, structural estimation requires finding and exploiting manifestly exogenous changes in 
a range of independent variables, a task which can be nearly impossible. Thus, structural studies 
often settle for partly exogenous instruments, strict exclusion restrictions, and other unrealistic 
methodological assumptions. Here we take the middle route. 
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Specifically, we conduct our analysis in two stages. In the first stage, we use pool cross-sections 
of the Greek Labour Force Survey to estimate the `naive' effect of youth employment outcomes 
on the probability of living with one's parents, and whether this effect changes after the 
beginning of the crisis. In the second stage, we address the joint determination of children's 
decisions to work and coreside with parents. To achieve this, we instrument the employment 
status of adult children with the growth rate of real GDP at the regional level and an indicator of 
health insurance ownership at the individual level. In combination with controls for state and 
year fixed-effects and for various outcomes and characteristics of the parents' generation, these 
instruments clean out the influence of non-economic forces and of any parental economic 
hardship from our coefficient of interest. 
 
In addition to a clean identification strategy, our paper contributes new pertinent evidence. 
First, we confirm that Greek households provided a social safety net to its young members 
before the crisis and this role has become significantly more important during the crisis. Our 
most conservative estimates suggest that having a job lowers the probability of living with one's 
parents by 9.5-12.5 percentage points. This is a sizable effect considering that it reflects only 
those economic influences on coresidence that work through the labour market and is net of 
influences through other economic channels; e.g., through educational participation or marriage 
rates that also fluctuate with economic activity. What is more impressive is that our estimate 
doubles if one isolates the post-crisis period. While evidence of counter-cyclical changes in 
coresidence is abundant, such an increase in cyclicality during a crisis is a unique finding and 
particularly noteworthy given that coresidence in Greece has been historically so high that there 
has been little scope for further increase. 
 
Another important result is that the Greek family home provides refuge not only for youth with 
no jobs but also for those with precarious jobs. We find that job quality is as important in 
determining youth living arrangements as is employment status, with job insecurity playing a 
leading role. Finally, our findings reveal a gendered pattern in the causal determinants of living 
arrangements. For young men, we find no reverse causality between coresidence and 
employment outcomes, which implies that while youth labour market conditions influence 
young men's living arrangements, parents' finances or culture do not. In contrast, we find 
significant reverse causality for women, suggesting that parents' finances and culture may play a 
role. We further explore this result to find that, compared to their male counterparts, young 
women with older mothers and divorced or widowed fathers are more likely to live with them 
even though they can afford to live independently. This result is consistent with the cultural 
stereotype that daughters are expected to be the carers of parents at old age or in need. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 gives details on the data and presents descriptive 
statistics; section 3 explains the econometric approach; section 4 reports the results; and section 
5 provides concluding remarks. 
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2. Data and descriptive statistics 
 
2.1. Individual-level data 
The main database with which we conduct our analysis comprises the spring waves of the 
Greek Labour Force Survey (LFS) for the period 2002-2016. The LFS is a quarterly household 
survey, representative of the entire population, and covering detailed information on a wealth 
of demographic characteristics and labour market outcomes, including household composition 
and employment status. Each wave contains approximately 30,000 working-age individuals, of 
which around one-third are between 18 and 35 years of age - the youth population on which 
we focus. With these data it is straightforward to generate the main variables of interest. We 
use the mother ID, father ID, and spouse ID variables to identify those youths who coreside 
with their parents or parents-in-law, and we use reports of employment status to identify those 
youths who have a job. One drawback of the LFS is that if parents do not share the same 
household with young adults we do not observe them in the data. We partly address this issue 
by calculating and controlling in our regressions for region-level means of various economic and 
demographic characteristics of the parents' generation, which we assume that it comprises 
individuals ages 40-60. Unavoidably, the relevance of these controls diminishes with the 
frequency of youth migration across regions. 
 
The period we examine is particularly interesting because it includes the crisis years as well as 
several earlier years and is, thus, characterized by acute changes in economic conditions. From 
2002, when Greeks first started to transact with euros, and up to 2007, the Greek economy was 
galloping at an average annual rate of 4.1%. A number of events that took place in that period, 
including the hosting of the 2004 Olympic games in Athens, uplifted economic activity and the 
public sentiment. All this came to a halt when the great recession spread in Europe in 2008, 
with Greek GDP contracting by 0.3% that year. Gradually it became obvious that the country 
was consuming more than it produced. By 2009 the crisis spiralled out of control as the 
government lost its ability to borrow privately and could no longer sustain its dept. To stay 
afloat, Greece agreed to adopt severe austerity and painful reforms in exchange for three 
bailout loans from the International Monetary Fund and its European partners totalling a 
staggering 323 billion euros, and a 50% haircut on public debt owned by banks. 
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Over 2009-2015 the deterioration in economic conditions was so fierce that the Greek GDP 
contracted by an average annual rate of 4.2% (the highest drop was 9.1% in 2011)2. Naturally, 
this economic roller coaster caused tremendous variation in labour market outcomes, 
especially for young people for whom labour demand is more responsive to macroeconomic 
developments compared to labour demand for prime-age adults (Ryan 2001, Christopoulou and 
Ryan 2009, Christopoulou 2008, 2013)3. 
 
As we show in Figure 1, the LFS data clearly reflect this variation. Over 2002-2008, the share of 
youths who work (dashed line) is more or less stable at 70% for men and 50% for women and 
starts sinking abruptly in 2009, as the crisis begins. By 2013, youth employment has lost 28% of 
its pre-crisis value for both genders and increases marginally thereafter. Notably, the share of 
coresident youths (solid line) follows the reverse pattern over time. Before the crisis around 
60% of young men and 47% of young women live with their parents4 - rates that are very high 
by international standards5. After 2009 these shares show an upward trend, albeit of a 
reasonably modest magnitude relative to the corresponding changes in employment. In 
                                                 
2 The GDP growth rates are from the World Development Indicators database compiled by the World Bank. All loan agreements 
and memoranda of understanding signed by the Greek government and its lenders are available at 
http://crisisobs.gr/en/repository/?ct=98&st=103. 
 
4 This gender differential reflects the fact that, relative to men, women get married and leave the parental home at younger 
ages. 
5 According to estimates from the EU-SILK survey reported by Eurostat, over 2005-2015 the share of young men (women) aged 
18-34 living with their parents in the 19 euro-zone countries was on average 54% (41%). The corresponding rate reported for 
Greece over the same period is more than 10 percentage points higher (i.e. 69% (52%)) 
(http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=ilc_lvps08&lang=en). 
Figure 1: Share (%) of population aged 18-35 in intergenerational coresidence, work, and 
precarious work by gender 
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general, youth employment and coresidence seem to move in opposite directions but the 
negative association becomes particularly striking during the crisis. It is this basic correlation 
between the two series that motivates our research: it suggests that the decrease of job 
opportunities in Greece have increasingly deprived young adults of living on their own. 
 
Yet, having a job may not necessarily make autonomous living affordable for young people. If 
they have the option, those in poorly-paid, insecure jobs are likely to stay in their parental 
home; i.e. their behaviour should resemble that of the unemployed population. Therefore, it is 
important to consider both employment status and job quality as drivers of youth coresidence. 
To do this, we identify youths who earn minimum wages or lower;6 those who work 
temporarily; and the part-timers. In Figure 1 we show that the share of youths who belong in 
this category (dotted line) decreased slightly in the first half of the crisis when the economy was 
losing both good and bad jobs, but started rising in the second half of the crisis as many of the 
jobs that survived to that point worsened in quality. In our econometric analysis we use a 
variable that flags these youths together with those who are jobless and treat it as an 
alternative indicator of individual labour market status. 
 
To give a sense of the other variables available in the LFS, in Table 1 we provide means and 
frequencies for selected years.7 Specifically, we report statistics in 2005 (i.e. four years before 
the crisis, when Greece was under the euphoria of the Olympic games boom, and the 
impending recession was unforeseeable), in 2009 (the year that marked the beginning of the 
crisis), and in 2013 (by that year the economy had contracted by 32%, unemployment rate had 
rocketed, wages had been sliced, and the labour market had undergone severe deregulation). 
These statistics manifest clearly the deteriorating position of youths in the labour market that 
we discussed above, but also describe some pertinent demographic changes. First, the data 
suggest that the crisis may have affected women in their homemaking and childbearing 
decisions more than men. The percentage of young people who are married has been declining 
throughout the period of study, as has the percentage of young men who are parents, but the 
share of female parents and the share of young women who self-report as housewives shows a 
notable fall during the crisis. Second, the crisis does not appear to have steered a large part of 
the unemployed youth into school. The share of youth enrolled in education, which was 
trending up over 2005-2009, did not accelerate after the crisis for young women and stopped 
increasing altogether for young men. One can see a non-trivial increase in the average years of 
completed education but, considering the record-high youth unemployment rates over the 
period, this remains unimpressive. Third, the crisis has coincided with a small reshuffling of 
                                                 
6 Prior to 2015, the LFS collected wage data in bundles which differ from year to year, cannot be fully harmonized for the period 
of study, and do not accurately correspond to minimum wage values. For these reason, we treat as low wage earners those 
young people whose wage belongs to the minimum wage bundle or lower (note that, depending on hours of work, it is possible 
for wages to fall below the mandated minimum). The bundles which include the minimum wages [and the actual minimum 
wages] by year are as follows: 301-600 [499] euros in 2002; 501-750 [520-681] euros over 2003-2008; 700-799 [740-751] euros 
over 2009-2011; 500-699 [586] euros over 2012-2013; 400-599 [586] in 2014. From 2015 onward actual values of wages are 
reported rather than wage bundles. For comparison with the previous years, we _ag as low wage earners those who earn a 
maximum of 599 euros (all wages are monthly). 
7 Table A1 in the Appendix provides means and frequencies of selected variables for individuals aged 40-60 the age-group we 
treat as the parents' generation. 
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young people across geographical areas. Before 2009, the share of youth living in cities was 
fixed at 42% for men and 44% for women, whereas the share of youths living in rural areas was 
marginally declining. Over 2009-2013, the former share decreased and the latter increased, 
both by 2 percentage points. Because these demographic changes are related to the 
determination of youth living arrangements, it is important that we control for them in our 
models. 
Table 1: Weighted means and frequencies of selected variables, ages 18-35 
 
Of special interest is the share of youths who own health insurance, given that health insurance 
status is an instrumental variable in our econometric analysis. To be exact, this variable flags 
those individuals who own a health insurance booklet, which is the Greek equivalent of a health 
insurance card. While public health insurance coverage in Greece is supposed to be universal8, in 
practice some individuals are excluded depending on their work status (e.g. those who work 
occasionally, informally, or in the restaurant sector), while others may not utilize their right to 
health insurance (e.g. unemployed individuals who neglect to register with the public 
employment office or to renew their registration every three months). Most commonly, excluded 
individuals are young people who transition from school-to-work. As Table 1 shows, before the 
crisis more than 90% of young men and women owned a health insurance booklet but this share 
fell to 86% or less during the crisis. 
 
                                                 
8 Private health insurance is allowed only as secondary insurance. 
 Males  Females 
2005 2009 2013  2005 2009 2013 
Coresident 0,62 0,60 0,65  0,47 0,47 0,52 
Employed 0,73 0,72 0,51  0,50 0,53 0,38 
Jobless or in poor work 0,50 0,47 0,66  0,74 0,69 0,80 
In private sector job 0,63 0,61 0,43  0,41 0,42 0,30 
Temporary 0,08 0,09 0,05  0,08 0,09 0,05 
Part-time 0,02 0,03 0,04  0,05 0,06 0,05 
Low wage earner 0,18 0,13 0,10  0,19 0,16 0,10 
Has health insurance 0,93 0,92 0,83  0,92 0,93 0,86 
Age 27,2 27,3 27,5  27,1 27,4 27,3 
Married 0,25 0,21 0,18  0,43 0,40 0,35 
Has child (ren) 0,16 0,14 0,13  0,33 0,33 0,28 
Divorced/widowed 0,00 0,00 0,01  0,02 0,02 0,02 
Housewife     0,16 0,15 0,10 
Student 0,18 0,20 0,20  0,19 0,21 0,23 
Completed education (years) 11,7 11,9 12,4  12,3 12,6 13,1 
Lives in city 0,42 0,42 0,40  0,44 0,44 0,42 
Lives in rural areas 0,18 0,17 0,19  0,15 0,14 0,16 
Foreign born 0,09 0,13 0,10  0,08 0,12 0,10 
Earns income from assets 0,02 0,01 0,01  0,01 0,01 0,01 
Earns income from benefits 0,02 0,03 0,03  0,02 0,04 0,04 
Disabled 0,01 0,01 0,01  0,01 0,01 0,01 
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2.2 Regional Indicators 
We complement the individual-level data with a number of macro-level indicators that capture 
region-specific economic conditions. Specifically, we draw data on GDP growth and net migration 
per capita from EUROSTAT, and we (imperfectly) construct two indicators of rental cost, since no 
such data exist for Greece at the regional level9. These indicators vary across the 13 
administrative regions of Greece but they are not available over the entire period of interest and, 
therefore, they cost in terms of observations. The variables on GDP growth and migration are 
available over 2002-2014 and the rental cost indexes we construct cover only the period 2007-
2015 (for a number of practical reasons we do not cover earlier years). The migration indicator is 
problematic for the additional reason that it measures immigrants of all ages, and, thus it reflects 
youth-specific migration patterns to the degree that these co-vary with those of older adults. 
 
To construct the rental cost indicators we use the consumer price index for rents, which is 
produced at the national level by the Hellenic Statistical Authority, and the so-called objective 
values of land property by locality published in 2007 by the Ministry of Finance. These objective 
values are set by the government based on selected criteria and are then used for determining 
the taxable value of property when this is sold or transferred. Over 2007-2015, there have been 
no changes in these objective values despite widespread discontent concerning their discrepancy 
with the actual/commercial values, especially during the crisis. Under the premise that the 
regional variation in the objective values is reasonably correlated with the respective variation in 
the commercial values, we combine them with the time-series of rental CPI to obtain an indicator 
that varies both temporally and spatially. We produce a maximum rental cost index, which one 
can interpret as representing the rental cost in the up- scale neighbourhoods of each region, and 
a minimum rental cost index, which one can interpret accordingly, i.e. as representing the rental 
cost in the down-market neighbourhoods10. 
 
3. Empirical Strategy 
 
We start with a baseline model that correlates youth employment status with living 
arrangements. Specifically, we model the probability of coresiding with parents (or parents-in-
law) of individual i living in region r in time period t as: 
Pr (Cirt = 1) = α0 + α1 Pr (Wirt = 1) + α2 Xirt + α3 Yrt + Dr + Dt + uirt, (1) 
where C and W are binary variables that take value one if individual i coresides and works, 
respectively, and zero otherwise; X is a vector of individual characteristics, Y is a vector of 
characteristics of the parents' generation and other regional controls; Dr and Dt are vectors of 
                                                 
9 We plot these data in Figures A1 and A2 in the Appendix. 
10 Specifically, we drew from the website of the General Secretariat of Information Systems and Administrative Support the official 
tables with the 2007 _objective_ property values. From these we derived the maximum and minimum _zone values_ and _land use 
factors_ for each administrative region and inserted them in the specified formulas to calculate the corresponding maximum and 
minimum _objective_ land prices. The regional variation in these prices is significantly larger for the maximum than the minimum - 
a difference that would be masked if we instead calculated mean prices (which would be complicated to do and would require 
restrictive assumptions). The product of these (maximum/minimum) prices by region with the rental CPI by year is what we call the 
(maximum/minimum) rental cost index. 
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region- and year-level fixed effects; and u is the error term. We estimate this model using a 
standard probit model and we interpret the resulting coefficient α1 as a conditional correlation 
between individual employment status and individual coresidence status (or as the `naive' effect 
of youth employment on the probability of coresidence). We then test the hypothesis that this 
correlation changes after the beginning of the crisis by adding among the regressors the 
interaction term Pr (Wirt = 1) ∗ R, where R is a dummy variable equal to zero in all years before 
2009 (i.e. prior to the recession) and equal to one in all other years (i.e. during the recession). 
 
Obviously,  provides no information about the direction of causality between the decisions of 
young people to work and live with their parents. Since the focus of this paper is on those youths 
who decide to stay at the parental home because they cannot afford to live independently, we 
next attempt to identify this causal effect by taking a more structural approach. There are two 
main causal pathways that that we wish to isolate from our results. First, youths may decide to 
co-reside with their parents if it is their parents, not themselves, who need financial support. It is 
possible that this effect of reverse causality has affected Greek families during the crisis, given the 
sizable cuts on wages and pensions. Second, youth employment and living arrangements may be 
influenced by a third unobserved variable, e.g. parental preferences, family values, and culture. 
Parents' preferences may be such that they encourage their children to stay at home and away 
from the labour market, thus creating a negative association between youth work and 
coresidence that is unrelated to economic factors. For example, overprotecting parents may 
sponsor the desired life-style of their children in order to remove their incentive to look for a job 
and move away from home. Similarly, parents who carry conservative values may simply forbid 
their children to work and move out. This practice is not uncommon in traditional Greek societies, 
particularly for young women who are raised to become good housewives and are not supposed 
to leave the parental home or work outside the household until they get married. 
 
To net out the aforementioned effects from our results we treat (1) as the structural-form 
equation in a system of two seemingly unrelated probit equations. The reduced-form equation of 
this system models youth employment status as a function of instruments and exogenous 
variables, as: 
Pr (Wirt = 1) = β0 + β1 Zirt + β2 Xirt + β3 Yrt + Dr + Dt + virt,  (2) 
where Z is the vector of instruments. This vector includes two variables that reflect purely 
economic influences: a dummy that denotes health insurance status, which we observe at the 
individual level and we assume that it drives youth employment status from the supply-side, and 
the growth rate of real GDP, which we measure at the regional level and we use it to capture 
fluctuations in aggregate demand. The identifying assumption is that the instruments are 
correlated to the probability of having a job, but they are orthogonal to the probability of living 
with parents. The former instrument satisfies this assumption in principle, as the law entitles 
those older than 18 to direct health insurance if they work or they are enrolled to formal 
education. The law also entitles youths ages 18-26 to indirect health insurance, as dependent 
family members, but only certain funds require the indirectly insured to coreside with parents11, 
                                                 
11 E.g. to issue a family insurance booklet, IKA requires proof that youths coreside with parents but OAEE does not. This distinction 
held before the unification of all insurance funds under the umbrella of EFKA and continues to hold to date. 
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and we can easily remove these youths from the sample to verify robustness. The validity of the 
latter instrument requires that the local economy does not affect coresidence status directly, i.e. 
via the housing prices and rents, and that youth employment outcomes depend on regional 
rather than national economic conditions, i.e. that young people look for work in their local 
labour markets. To meet these requirements, we include the rental cost and migration indicators 
as controls in our regressions, acknowledging that these are imperfect. 
 
Because both instruments capture economic factors alone, they net out all non-economic 
influences, such as culture, from the coefficient of interest. The regional fixed effects, as well as 
dummies that flag whether a young person lives in a rural or metropolitan area, also work to this 
effect by removing biases that arise from a correlation between unobserved cultural differences 
across regions and economic forces. However, isolating independent variation in economic 
influences for older and younger adults is less straightforward. Clearly, the GDP growth rate 
represents overall rather than youth-specific market conditions, and children's health insurance 
status is likely correlated with parents’ health insurance status. Therefore, the instruments may 
not single-handedly remove influences of parental economic hardship from the coefficient of 
interest. As we mentioned earlier, because the LFS does not include information on parents who 
do not coreside with their children, we aid identification by con- trolling for the fraction of the 
parental population employed and insured in each region (among other characteristics of the 
parents' generation in Y). This helps the instruments serve their intended purpose. Regardless, it 
is most likely that α1 predominantly captures the impact of children's economic hardship on 
coresidence, since youth employment outcomes over respond to economic influences compared 
to those of prime-age adults and parents more easily smooth temporary income shocks using 
previous savings or borrowing12. 
 
Given the focus on youth work, our structural model abstracts from a number of other 
mechanisms through which economic conditions may affect parental coresidence. As is widely 
recognized in the literature, an adverse economic environment may change young people's 
decisions to study, relocate or migrate, marry or cohabitate with a partner, have children and 
others. All these decisions may in turn affect their living arrangements and, in reality, they are 
jointly determined. However, it would be too ambitious to model them as such in this study, given 
the difficulties that would arise in identification. Instead, our strategy is to condition on these 
variables in our regressions and treat the resulting αˆ1 as a lowest bound estimate of the 
economic impact on coresidence; i.e. the impact that derives solely from the labour market 
conditions. 
 
                                                 
12 For a less formal way to address reverse causality, we refer the reader to a closely related study where we ask the same 
research question and attempt to answer it at a more aggregated level of analysis (Christopoulou and Pantalidou 2018). In that 
study, we use the LFS data to calculate, by region and year, the share of youths who live with their parents as a proxy of mutual 
dependency between parents and adult children, and the share of youths who live with their parents and also receive intra-family 
transfers as a proxy of one-way dependency of youths on parents. We then use panel data analysis to examine the correlation of 
each variable with the youth unemployment rate. Comparing the two correlations allows us to assess the presence and nature of 
reverse causality in the youth unemployment-coresidence relationship. Notably, that approach leads to conclusions very similar to 
the conclusions we reach here. 
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As standard, we assume that the errors u and v have a bivariate standard normal joint distribution 
with correlation ρ. If ρ = 0, the causal effect of interest results from the separate estimation of 
equation (1) by a simple probit model. If ρ ƒ= 0 we conclude that youth work status is endogenous 
and the causal αˆ is produced by the joint estimation.  In all cases we estimate our models 
separately for men and women, and we compute standard errors robust to region-level clusters. 
 
While the bivariate probit estimation detects the existence and extent of reverse causality 
between youth work and coresidence status, it provides no information on its sources. To derive 
suggestive evidence on this we limit the sample to those youths who live with their parents, for 
whom parental characteristics are observable, and test how their probability of having a good job 
depends on these characteristics. Specifically, we estimate the following model: 
Pr (Wirt = 1|Cirt = 1) = γ0 + γ1  + γ2  + γ3  + γ4  + Dr + Dt + εirt (3) 
where XM and XF are vectors of characteristics of the mother and father, respectively. 
 
4. Results 
We present our first set of results in Table 2. These results correspond to different specification of 
equation (1) estimated separately for males (columns 1-3) and females (columns 4-6). In all cases, 
controls include only the available individual characteristics from the LFS data and, thus, the 
sample covers the entire period of interest. For each gender, the first specification yields negative 
and statistically significant correlations between employment status and coresidence. The second 
specification adds indicators of poor job quality, all of which appear to have a positive correlation 
with coresidence, while their inclusion increases the negative coefficient on employment status. 
Apart from the usual suspects, i.e. temporary, part-time, and low-paying jobs, which one expects 
to impede youths from living independently, we also include an indicator for private jobs, even 
though these are not necessarily poor. We include this indicator because, compared to jobs in the 
Greek public sector, private jobs are traditionally outclassed in terms of wages, benefits, security, 
and lack of discrimination (Christopoulou and Monastiriotis 2014, 2016). Indeed, the results 
confirm that this difference affects youths in their decision to live autonomously. Because our 
indicators of job quality are endogenous and easier to handle if they are joined together, the third 
specification treats poor job holders and jobless youth as one category (as mentioned earlier, we 
define poor job holders as those who work part-time, temporarily, or earn low wages). The results 
validate this grouping by yielding a positive and statistically significant correlation between being 
jobless or having a poor job and living with parents. 
 
In all specifications the control variables perform as expected. The individuals in our sample are 
less likely to live with their parents if they are older, foreign-born, highly educated or in 
education, if they reside in cities, or earn some non-labour income. The same goes for those who 
are married, divorced/widowed, have children, or for the women who self-identify as housewives. 
Conversely, youths who live in rural areas or those who are disabled are more likely to live with 
their parents. These results are substantively the same in all models we estimate, so to save space 
we will not report them from this point on13. 
                                                 
13 Of course, the full set of results is available upon request. 
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Table 2: Baseline results; Probit regression of coresidence status for 18-35 year-olds, 2002-2016 
  Males    Females  
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Employed -0.353*** -0.789***   -0.261*** -0.518***  
 (0.040) (0.058)   (0.022) (0.025)  
In private sector job  0.439***    0.213***  
  (0.047)    (0.029)  
Temporary  0.128***    0.124***  
  (0.045)    (0.040)  
Part-timer  0.146**    0.093***  
  (0.065)    (0.020)  
Low wage earner  0.129***    0.121***  
  (0.023)    (0.038)  
Jobless or in poor job   0.319***    0.273*** 
   (0.028)    (0.025) 
Age -0.076*** -0.089*** -0.098***  -0.051 -0.062* -0.073** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.014)  (0.035) (0.034) (0.033) 
Age squared 0.000 0.001* 0.001***  -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Completed education -0.017*** -0.011* -0.015**  -0.023*** -0.020*** -0.022*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
City -0.410*** -0.420*** -0.412***  -0.398*** -0.398*** -0.399*** 
 (0.049) (0.048) (0.050)  (0.039) (0.040) (0.040) 
Rural area 0.881*** 0.870*** 0.881***  0.866*** 0.870*** 0.873*** 
 (0.081) (0.079) (0.080)  (0.092) (0.094) (0.094) 
Foreign born -0.985*** -1.054*** -1.050***  -0.404*** -0.434*** -0.438*** 
 (0.060) (0.061) (0.061)  (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) 
Disabled 0.308*** 0.305*** 0.378***  0.551*** 0.550*** 0.608*** 
 (0.066) (0.066) (0.064)  (0.068) (0.069) (0.066) 
Married/Cohabitating -1.782*** -1.772*** -1.777***  -2.051*** -2.048*** -2.044*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.026)  (0.039) (0.040) (0.042) 
Student -0.954*** -0.970*** -0.886***  -0.844*** -0.843*** -0.790*** 
 (0.236) (0.234) (0.240)  (0.201) (0.199) (0.197) 
Has child (ren) -0.365*** -0.376*** -0.362***  -0.322*** -0.327*** -0.326*** 
 (0.051) (0.054) (0.052)  (0.069) (0.069) (0.068) 
Divorced/Widowed -0.596*** -0.585*** -0.594***  -0.721*** -0.729*** -0.727*** 
 (0.064) (0.068) (0.067)  (0.046) (0.048) (0.049) 
Income from assets -0.472*** -0.486*** -0.444***  -0.533*** -0.544*** -0.517*** 
 (0.070) (0.072) (0.067)  (0.081) (0.085) (0.080) 
Income from benefits -0.072 -0.096 -0.016  -0.123*** -0.137*** -0.083* 
 (0.064) (0.062) (0.051)  (0.044) (0.043) (0.044) 
Housewife     -0.300*** -0.299*** -0.222*** 
     (0.036) (0.034) (0.029) 
Constant 3.176*** 3.311*** 3.026***  2.736*** 2.826*** 2.662*** 
 (0.260) (0.248) (0.260)  (0.466) (0.456) (0.466) 
Observations 106,113 106,113 106,113  103,428 103,428 103,428 
Cluster-robust standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls: year & region dummies. 
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The main message from Table 2 is that all conditional correlations between work outcomes 
and coresidence are statistically significant and carry the expected sign. The next question to 
ask is whether these have changed during the crisis. In Table 3, we interact the two work-
status indicators (i.e. being employed and being jobless or in poor work) with the crisis 
dummy. The estimated coefficient on each interaction term shows how the correlation 
during the crisis differs from the correlation in all other years (i.e. adding the coefficient on 
the work status indicator with that on the interaction term gives the correlation during the 
crisis). Impressively, we find that the correlation more than doubles during the crisis and this 
holds for both young men and women. Employed young Greeks are significantly less likely to 
live with their parents during the crisis than they were pre-crisis, while unemployed and 
poorly employed youths are significantly more likely to live with parents during the crisis 
than pre-crisis. This result can be easily explained assuming that none or few youths who 
entered the labour market during the crisis managed to find jobs (or good jobs) and, 
therefore, most of them remained in the parental home. However, it may also reflect that 
the majority of young workers who managed to sustain a job throughout the period of study 
(presumably those with the _best_ jobs) were already living autonomously before the crisis, 
while the majority of youths who lost their jobs or kept poor jobs during the crisis were 
already coresiding with parents before the crisis. For these youths, coresidence before the 
crisis was out of precaution, while during the crisis it was out of necessity. Most likely both 
effects took place: during the crisis the Greek family sheltered all new labour market 
entrants who faced virtually zero employment opportunities, and continued to shelter those 
who were unemployed or in marginal employment before the crisis. 
 
Table 3: Testing for a crisis effect; Probit regression of coresidence status for 18-35 
year-olds, 2002-2016 
 Males Females 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Employed 
-0.195*** 
(0.044)  
-0.168*** 
(0.028)  
Crisis * Employed 
-0.289*** 
(0.026)  
-0.195*** 
(0.024)  
Jobless or in poor job  
0.200*** 
(0.030)  
0.188*** 
(0.032) 
Crisis * Jobless or in poor job  
0.269*** 
(0.025)  
0.194*** 
(0.025) 
Observations 106,113 106,113 103,428 103,428 
Cluster-robust standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
         Controls: as in Table 2 
 
To our knowledge, this finding that the relationship between work and coresidence becomes 
strikingly stronger during the crisis has not be found in other countries. The example of the 
US experience makes for a good comparison. As Bitler and Hoynes (2015) show, the 
responsiveness of living arrangements to the unemployment rate in the US was not 
significantly higher in the Great Recession compared to all other years since 1980. Of course, 
this contrast in the results between the two countries is not surprising considering their 
differences in the severity of the recession, the availability of alternative safety nets, and 
their cultural norms. 
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The following step in our analysis is to test whether the results are biased due to important 
omitted variables. It is conceivable that the baseline regressions overestimate the effect of 
work status on coresidence to compensate for missing controls for relevant parental 
characteristics, migration patterns or the cost of living independently. In the regressions we 
report in Table 4 we add proxies of these missing factors; i.e., we include mean 
characteristics of the parent's generation, net migration per capita, and our minimum and 
maximum rental cost indicators, all of which vary by region and year. The inclusion of these 
controls - mostly the rental cost indicators – significantly reduces our original sample. Our 
data now cover the period 2007- 2014 and, thus, the crisis period dominates. In all cases the 
correlations of interest are highly robust, whereas only a handful of the added variables are 
statistically significant. Specifically, young men are influenced by some of the parental 
characteristics while young women are influenced by the rental cost. In regions where a 
higher share of parents is educated, receives pension, or income from assets young males 
are less likely to live in the parental home. In regions where the up-market neighborhoods 
have higher rental costs young women are more likely to live in the parental home14. 
 
Table 4: Testing robustness to additional controls; Probit regression of coresidence status for 
18-35 year-olds, 2007-2014 
 Males  Females 
(1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Employed -0.398***  -0.291*** 
 (0.043)  (0.024) 
Jobless or in poor job 0.347***  0.318*** 
 (0.032)  (0.021) 
Characteristics of parents' generation    
Age 0.044 0.041 -0.089 -0.084 
 (0.067) (0.065) (0.063) (0.064) 
Completed education -0.089** -0.079* -0.089 -0.080 
 (0.040) (0.042) (0.059) (0.059) 
Married/Cohabitating -0.625 -0.741 0.207 0.195 
 (1.121) (1.165) (1.363) (1.374) 
Divorced/Widowed -1.532 -1.801 -0.605 -0.639 
 (2.793) (2.798) (2.334) (2.279) 
Pensioners -2.734* -2.296* -0.631 -0.368 
 (1.402) (1.387) (2.720) (2.770) 
Employed -0.149 -0.398 -0.909 -0.952 
 (1.207) (1.196) (0.719) (0.691) 
Health insurance -0.718 -0.768 -0.370 -0.247 
 (0.956) (0.949) (1.232) (1.209) 
                                                 
14 Table A2 in the Appendix provides two additional robustness checks: (i) columns 1-2 and 5-6 report estimates of the 
baseline specification with mean parental characteristics by region as additional controls and no other macro-level 
indicators (i.e. sample size remains maximum); and (ii) columns 3-4 and 7-8 report estimates of the baseline specification 
after removing all potentially endogenous controls (i.e. years of education, educational participation and all indicators on 
area of residence and family status). As one should expect, the correlations of interest change significantly in the latter 
estimations, especially for females for whom marital status is a very important driver of parental coresidence. Several other 
robustness test are available in Pantalidou (2016). 
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Income from assets -3.038*** -3.189*** -1.072 -1.240* 
 (0.908) (0.891) (0.706) (0.733) 
Disabled 3.499 3.291 -1.794 -1.532 
 (2.790) (2.781) (1.828) (1.817) 
Net migration per capita -0.917 -0.927 0.252 0.308 
 (0.910) (0.932) (0.617) (0.613) 
Minimum rental cost index 1.400 1.566 0.044 0.061 
 (1.335) (1.325) (0.747) (0.757) 
Maximum rental cost index 0.057 0.051 0.266*** 0.272*** 
 (0.113) (0.113) (0.093) (0.092) 
Observations 53,344 53,344 51,100 51,100 
     Cluster-robust standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
      Controls: as in baseline specification 
 
 
Table 5: Estimating the causal effect of work status on coresidence; Bivariate probit 
regressions for 18-35 year-olds, 2007-2014 
 Males Females 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Second-stage: Coresidence status 
 
    
   Employed -0.524***  -0.562*** 
  (0.176)  (0.116) 
   Jobless or in poor job  0.618***  0.831*** 
  (0.239)  (0.114) 
First-stage: Work status     
   GDP growth rate 0.792* -0.145 -0.221 0.604 
 (0.437) (0.499) (0.412) (0.364) 
   Health insurance 1.363*** -1.217*** 1.217*** -1.178*** 
 (0.027) (0.021) (0.056) (0.076) 
Observations 53,344 53,344 51,100 51,100 
Wald test of exogeneity 0.407 1.103 4.953** 17.04*** 
 
X2-test of joint sign. of instruments 
[0.523] 
2531*** 
[0.294] 
3296*** 
[0.026] 
505.5*** 
[0.000] 
255*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
 
Despite the smaller sample, we next explore causality using this conservative specification to 
maintain maximum precision. We present the bivariate probit estimates of equations (1) and 
(2) in Table 5. Looking first at the reduced form equations, it is apparent that the regional GDP 
growth rate does not perform well as an instrument (it is only significant at the 10% level in the 
first specification estimated for males) and understandably so. It is not realistic to expect that 
the regional economy is the relevant labour market in the decision-making for young Greeks 
since many migrate for work both internally and abroad. Although we try to control for 
migration patterns, the indicator at hand is evidently deficient as it does not significantly 
explain coresidence status (see again Table 4). Regardless, identification is achieved through 
the health insurance indicator, which is highly significant and carries the expected sign in all 
cases. Taken together, the two instruments are also statistically significant. 
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Because the bivariate probit estimations provide no further diagnostics for instrument 
performance we successfully validate our results in two ways. First, we carry out a 2SLS 
estimation and pass the complete set of available diagnostics (see Table A3 in the Appendix). 
Second, we repeat the bivariate estimation after excluding from the sample those youths that 
are potentially insured as dependents (i.e. those that are younger than 27 and out of work), for 
whom health insurance may not be orthogonal to coresidence status (see Table A4 in the 
Appendix). The results are robust in both cases. 
 
However, instrumenting the employment status is not always necessary. For men, the Wald-
test rejects the hypothesis that the error terms between the two equations are correlated and, 
thus, the work-status variables can be treated as exogenous. It follows that, for men, the 
correlations we reported previously from the probit regressions can be interpreted as causal. In 
contrast, for women, the Wald-test provides evidence of reverse causality. Thus, for them, the 
causal effects of the work status indicators on coresidence are indicated by the coefficients in 
the structural equations of the bivariate probit. These coefficients have the same sign as the 
ones from the probit estimation but are significantly larger, implying that there is some 
unobserved factor that weakens the causal effect of work status on coresidence. 
 
Table 6: Marginal effects; Average predicted probabilities of coresidence status from regressions 
with full controls, 2007-2014 
 Males Females 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Probit regressions (Table 4) 
     
Assuming no youths are employed 0.684***  0.520***  
 (0.007)  (0.003)  
Assuming all youths are employed 0.589***  0.457***  
 (0.004)  (0.003)  
Assuming no youths are jobless or in poor jobs  0.580***  0.440*** 
  (0.004)  (0.003) 
Assuming all youths are jobless or in poor jobs  0.665***  0.510*** 
  (0.004)  (0.002) 
Bivariate probit regressions (Table 5)     
Assuming no youths are employed 0.700***  0.546***  
 (0.021)  (0.010)  
Assuming all youths are employed 0.575***  0.422***  
 0.575***  (0.017)  
Assuming no youths are jobless or in poor jobs  0.539***  0.349*** 
  (0.039)  (0.023) 
Assuming all youths are jobless or in poor jobs  0.692***  0.540*** 
  (0.022)  (0.006) 
Observations 53,344 53,344 51,100 51,100 
 
To give a sense of the magnitudes involved, in Table 6 we report the marginal effects that 
correspond to the coefficients from the probit and bivariate probit models. Recall that the 
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causal effects are produced by the probit regression for young men and the bivariate probit 
for young women. The effects are sizable in all cases, especially considering that they are 
only part of the effect of economic forces on coresidence (i.e. the part that works through 
the labour market alone). We find that having a job reduces the probability of living with 
parents by 9.5 percentage points for men and 12.5 percentage points for women. 
Conversely, being jobless or having a bad job increases the probability of living with parents 
by 8.5 percentage points for men and 19.1 percentage points for women. 
 
A note on the striking gender differences in our results is in order here. Our intuition is that 
these are connected to traditional cultural norms about gender-roles according to which 
young women are under stricter parental supervision and enjoy less freedom of choice than 
young men, but they are also more expected to care for dependent parents. To start with, 
the causal effect of joblessness or poor work is more than double for women relative to 
men. We can only speculate that this gap that young women are (raised to be) more risk 
averse than men, or they do not have alternative routes to living autonomously, e.g. they 
cannot rely on monetary transfers from parents in order to move away from home. 
Secondly, the causality in the work-coresidence relationship runs one-way for men, whereas 
for women it runs both ways. We interpret this finding as a first indication that both sons 
and daughters live in the parental home when they do not work and thus need support from 
their parents, but daughters also live in the parental home when they do work and their 
parents need support from them. 
 
We provide further evidence on the sources of reverse causality for women in Table 7. First, 
we limit the sample to those youths who live in the parental home, we then regress the 
probability of having a good job (i.e. a full-time, permanent job that pays above the 
minimum wage) on the work-status and other characteristics of both parents, and, finally, 
we test whether the results differ between genders. We find that young men and women 
are less likely to have a good job if their parents are jobless or have bad jobs, and more likely 
to have a good job if their parents have retired as pensioners. 
 
In fact, mother's work status influences daughters and sons equally, whereas father's work 
status exerts a significantly higher influence on sons than on daughters. We attribute these 
results to unobservable characteristics shared between youths and parents, e.g. family 
mentality about work, 'inherited' professional ambitions, and access to common 
professional networks, all of which can be gender-specific. Although this finding does not 
illuminate causality differences in the work-coresidence relationship between genders, 
controlling for parental work-status in the regressions helps to expose an explanation. 
Comparing youths who coreside with parents of the same work status, we find that young 
men are significantly less likely than women to have a good job if they live with older 
mothers. Conversely, young women are significantly more likely than men to have a good 
job if they live with divorced or widowed fathers15. Both of these results support the 
                                                 
15 Other gender differences in the results (not shown in Table 7) are that young women are more likely to have a good job if 
they live with foreign mothers and educated fathers, whereas young men are more likely to have a good job if they live 
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hypothesis that, unlike men, young women may choose to coreside with aging or lonely 
parents even though they can afford to live independently. This interpretation is consistent 
with evidence from other studies that parents rely on daughters for care more than they do 
on sons (see Mellor (2001) and Klimaviciute et al. (2017) and studies cited therein) and falls 
well within the paradigm of South European familism (Saraceno 1994). 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Our paper contributes new evidence to a growing and inconclusive literature on youth living 
arrangements. We show that the causal relationship between work and coresidence for 
young Greeks is negative, statistically and economically significant, and has become stronger 
during the crisis. We also show that, although all youth coreside with parents when they 
cannot make their own living, young women in particular may also coreside in response to 
parental needs. This evidence is of special interest as it provides an insight into how a society 
with historically high rates of parental coresidence, driven very much by culture, responds to 
economic strain of a magnitude and duration as that of the recent Greek crisis. It appears 
that cultural norms that influence living arrangements are not static but rather respond 
dynamically to economic forces to shelter vulnerable youths and vulnerable parents. Yet, the 
gendered pattern in cultural norms persists, since women keep their traditional role as 
primary carers for parents in need. 
 
Our results have important implications for the social cohesion of the Greek population. One 
the one hand, the Greek family stepped in to shelter young adults at a time when all other 
safety nets failed. The period for which we find that the role of the parental home as a 
refuge for vulnerable youths intensified coincides with the period when recession-driven 
suicide rates and depression climaxed (Drydakis 2015, Economou et al. 2016). Had it not 
been for the Greek family, both the material well-being of the young generation and their 
psychological and emotional health would have been further jeopardized. On the other 
hand, the generation of young Greeks who exited adolescence during the great recession 
had no option but to remain dependent on parents for a longer period. For these youths, the 
transition-to-adulthood was protracted, as was all the uncertainty  that  comes  with  it, and  
this  will  likely  cause  delays  in other milestones of their adult identity, like marriage, 
children, and home ownership. This highlights the urgency for placing this generation of 
youths in the labour market, but also for setting up public safety nets that will shield future 
generations from similar adversities. Policy action on both fronts is much needed to expedite 
the decline of youth unemployment as the economy slowly recovers (e.g. by offering 
incentives to employers to hire new labour market entrants); to improve the quality of jobs 
available to young people (e.g. by increasing the standards for a typical and precarious 
employment); and to avoid new waves of late nest- leavers (the introduction of minimum 
income nationwide in 2017 was a step in this direction. 
                                                                                                                                                        
with mothers who receive some income from other household members (including their husbands). All other variables show 
statistically insignificant differences between genders. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A 1: Weighted means and frequencies of selected variables, ages 40-60 
 2005  2009  2013 
Age 49.58  49.37  49.47 
Completed education 10.41  10.95  11.63 
Married/Cohabitating 0.84  0.82  0.79 
Divorced/Widowed 0.09  0.08  0.09 
Pensioners 0.05  0.05  0.06 
Employed 0.66  0.69  0.59 
Health insurance 0.97  0.97  0.93 
Income from assets 0.06  0.04  0.06 
Disabled 0.03  0.02  0.02 
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